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With respect to probabilistic mixtures of the strategies in non-cooperative games, quantum game
theory provides guarantee of fixed-point stability, the so-called Nash equilibrium. This permits
players to choose mixed quantum strategies that prepare mixed quantum states optimally under
constraints. We show here that fixed-point stability of Nash equilibrium can also be guaranteed for
pure quantum strategies via an application of the Nash embedding theorem, permitting players to
prepare pure quantum states optimally under constraints.
PACS numbers: 42.50.Ar,03.67.Bg,42.79.Sz
INTRODUCTION
As quantum technologies increase in scale and
complexity, constrained optimization of the under-
lying quantum processes will also increase in impor-
tance. A good example is the case of a quantum
Internet as a network of quantum devices that pro-
cess and relay quantum information using telepor-
tation and entanglement swapping. Connectivity
constraints arise naturally when optimizing classi-
cal network resources [1, 2], and similar constraints
manifest in the design and operation of quantum
networks [3–5]. Similarly, quantum computers im-
plementing fault-tolerant operations must optimize
circuit design in order to minimize the decoherence
due to the intrinsic physical noise in gate operation
while also adhering to constraints in the circuit lay-
out, scheduling, and parallelization. Finding opti-
mal solutions to such constrained optimization prob-
lems are expected to maximize the efficiency and
performance of quantum information technologies.
Non-cooperative game theory [6] studies optimiza-
tion under constraints and can offer useful insights
into the engineering of scalable quantum technolo-
gies such as optimal bounds on errors and their
correction in quantum computations. Any quan-
tum physical process modeled as a non-cooperative
game describes a quantum game of the same type.
The first instance of non-cooperative game-theoretic
modeling of quantum physical processes appears to
be the 1980 work of A. Blaquiere [7], where wave
mechanics are considered as a two player, zero-sum
(strictly competitive) differential game and a mini-
max result is established for certain quantum phys-
ical aspects. The more recent and more sustained
game-theoretic treatment of quantum physical pro-
cesses was initiated in 1999 with the work of Meyer
[8]. Meyer’s work considered quantum computa-
tional and quantum algorithmic aspects of quantum
physics as non-cooperative games.
The year 1999 also saw the publication of the pa-
per [9] by Eisert et al. in which a quantum infor-
mational model for the informational component of
two players games was considered. This consider-
ation was in the same spirit as the consideration
of randomizing in a game which produces the so-
calledmixed game played with mixed strategies. The
quantum informational model of Eisert et al. pro-
duces a quantized game. The inspiration for consid-
ering extensions of the informational aspect of games
to larger domains comes from John Nash’s famous
theorem [10] in economics which not only innovates
the solution concept of non-cooperative games as an
equilibrium problem but, for probabilistic extensions
of finite non-cooperative games, also guarantees its
existence.
The promise of a Nash equilibrium solution is
a foundational concept for game theory as it may
be used to guarantee the behavior for the non-
cooperating players. The relative simplicity of the
proof of Nash’s theorem for the existence of an equi-
librium in mixed strategies in conventional games re-
lies entirely on Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem [11].
For quantum games, Meyer established the exis-
tence of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, which
are modeled as mixed quantum states, using Glicks-
berg’s [12] extension of Kakutani’s fixed point theo-
rem to topological vector spaces.
2In this contribution, we note that the Kakutani
fixed-point theorem does not apply directly to quan-
tum games played with pure quantum strategies.
But, one can use Nash’s embedding of compact Rie-
mannian manifolds into Euclidean space [13] (Nash’s
other, mathematically more famous theorem) and,
under appropriate conditions, indirectly apply the
Kakutani fixed-point theorem to guarantee Nash
equilibrium in pure quantum strategies. We be-
gin with a mathematically formal discussion of non-
cooperative game theory and fixed-points.
NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES AND NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
An N player, non-cooperative game in normal
form is a function Γ
Γ :
N∏
i=1
Si −→ O, (1)
with the additional feature of the notion of non-
identical preferences over the elements of the set of
outcomes O, for every “player” of the game. The
preferences are a pre-ordering of the elements of O,
that is, for l,m, n ∈ O
m  m, and l  m and m  n =⇒ l  n. (2)
where the symbol  denotes “of less or equal pref-
erence”. Preferences are typically quantified numer-
ically for the ease of calculation of the payoffs. To
this end, functions Γi are introduced which act as
the payoff function for each player i magenta and
typically map elements of O into the real numbers
in a way that preserves the preferences of the play-
ers. That is,  is replaced with ≤ when analyzing
the payoffs. The factor Si in the domain of Γ is said
to be the strategy set of player i, and a play of Γ is
an n-tuple of strategies, one per player, producing a
payoff to each player in terms of his preferences over
the elements of O in the image of Γ.
A non-cooperative N -player quantum game in
normal form arises from (1) when one introduces
quantum physically relevant restrictions. We declare
a pure (strategy) quantum game to be any unitary
function
Q : ⊗Ni=1CP
di −→ ⊗Ni=1CP
di (3)
where CP di is the di-dimensional complex projective
Hilbert space of pure quantum states. The latter are
typically referred to as d-ary “quantum digits” or qu-
dits. By analogy with mixed game extensions, where
players’ strategies are probability distributions over
the elements of some set, the strategies of each player
in a quantum game consist of quantum superposi-
tions over the elements of a set of observable states
in CP di . These strategic choices are then mapped
by Q into ⊗Ni=1CP
di , over the elements of which the
players have non-identical preferences defined using
the overlap of two qudits as the payoff functions.
The overlap of two qudits is a complex number in
general. This is in contrast to the more standard
practice in classical game theory of defining payoff
functions that map into the real numbers. Indeed, in
the current context of pure strategy quantum games,
the expected value of an observable computed after
quantum measurement can be taken as the payoff
function mapping into the set of real numbers. How-
ever, as we will show later in detail, the non-linearity
of the expected value of an observable fails to guar-
antee Nash equilibrium whereas the linearity of the
overlap does not.
Nash equilibrium is a play of Γ in which every
player employs a strategy that is a best reply, with
respects to his preferences over the outcomes, to
the strategic choice of every other player. In other
words, unilateral deviation from a Nash equilibrium
by any one player in the form of a different choice of
strategy will produce an outcome which is less pre-
ferred by that player than before. Following Nash,
we say that a play p′ of Γ counters another play p
if Γi(p
′) ≥ Γi(p) for all players i, and that a self-
countering play is an (Nash) equilibrium.
Let Cp denote the set of all the plays of Γ that
counter p. Denote
∏N
i=1 Si by S for notational
convenience, and note that Cp ⊂ S and therefore
Cp ∈ 2
S. Further note that the game Γ can be fac-
tored as
Γ : S
ΓC−−→ 2S
E
−→ O (4)
where to any play p the map ΓC associates its coun-
tering set Cp via the payoff functions Γi. The set-
valued map ΓC may be viewed as a preprocessing
stage where players seek out a self-countering play,
and if one is found, it is mapped to its correspond-
ing outcome in O by the function E. The condi-
tion for the existence of a self-countering play, and
therefore of a Nash equilibrium, is that ΓC have a
fixed point, that is, an element p∗ ∈ S such that
p∗ ∈ ΓC(p
∗) = Cp∗ .
3In a general set-theoretic setting for non-
cooperative games, the map ΓC may not have a
fixed point. Hence, not all non-cooperative games
will have a Nash equilibrium. However, according
to Nash’s theorem, when the Si are finite and the
game is extended to its mixed version, that is, the
version in which randomization via probability dis-
tributions is allowed over the elements of all the Si,
as well as over the elements of O, then ΓC has at
least one fixed point and therefore at least one Nash
equilibrium.
Formally, given a game Γ with finite Si for all i,
its mixed version is the product function
Λ :
N∏
i=1
∆(Si) −→ ∆(O) (5)
where ∆(Si) is the set of probability distributions
over the ith player’s strategy set Si, and the set
∆(O) is the set of probability distributions over the
outcomes O. Payoffs are now calculated as expected
payoffs, that is, weighted averages of the values of
Γi, for each player i, with respect to probability dis-
tributions in ∆(O) that arise as the product of the
plays of Λ. Denote the expected payoff to player i
by the function Λi. Also, note that Λ restricts to
Γ. In these games, at least one Nash equilibrium
play is guaranteed to exist as a fixed point of Λ via
Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem.
Kakutani fixed-point theorem: Let S ⊂ Rn be
nonempty, compact, and convex, and let F : S →
2S be an upper semi-continuous set-valued mapping
such that F (s) is non-empty, closed, and convex for
all s ∈ S. Then there exists some s∗ ∈ S such that
s∗ ∈ F (s∗).
To see this, make S =
∏N
i=1∆(Si). Then S ⊂ R
n
and S is non-empty, bounded, and closed because
it is a finite product of finite non-empty sets. The
set S is also convex because its the convex hull of
the elements of a finite set. Next, let Cp be the set
of all plays of Λ that counter the play p. Then Cp
is non-empty, closed, and convex. Further, Cp ⊂ S
and therefore Cp ∈ 2
S . Since Λ is a game, it factors
according to (4)
Λ : S
ΛC−−→ 2S
EΠ−−→ ∆(O) (6)
where the map ΛC associates a play to its counter-
ing set via the payoff functions Λi. Since Λi are
all continuous, ΛC is continuous. Further, ΛC(s) is
non-empty, closed, and convex for all s ∈ S (we will
establish the convexity of ΛC(s) below; the remain-
ing conditions are also straightforward to establish).
Hence, Kakutani’s theorem applies and there exists
an s∗ ∈ S that counters itself, that is, s∗ ∈ ΛC(s
∗),
and is therefore a Nash equilibrium. The function
EΠ simply maps s
∗ to ∆(O) as the product proba-
bility distribution from which the Nash equilibrium
expected payoff is computed for each player.
The convexity of the ΛC(s) = Cp is straight for-
ward to show. Let r, s ∈ Cp. Then
Λi(r) ≥ Λi(p) and Λi(s) ≥ Λi(p) (7)
for all i. Now let 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and consider the convex
combination µr+ (1− µ)s which we will show to be
in Cp. First note that µr + (1 − µ)s ∈ S because S
is the product of the convex sets ∆(Si). Next, since
the Λi are all linear, and because of the inequalities
in (7) and the restrictions on the values of µ,
Λi(µr + (1− µ)s) = µΛi(r) + (1− µ)Λi(s) ≥ Λi(p)
(8)
whereby µr + (1− µ)s ∈ Cp and Cp is convex.
Going back to the game Γ in (1) defined in the gen-
eral set-theoretic setting, Kakutani’s theorem would
apply to Γ if the conditions are right, that is, when-
ever the image set of Γ is pre-ordered and Γi is both
linear and preserves the pre-order.
Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem can be general-
ized to include subsets S of convex topological vec-
tor spaces, as was done by Glicksberg in [12]. Us-
ing Glicksberg’s fixed-point theorem, one can show
that Nash equilibrium exists in games where the
strategy sets are infinite or possibly even uncount-
ably infinite. As mentioned earlier in the Introduc-
tion, Meyer used Glicksberg’s fixed-point theorem
to establish the guarantee of Nash equilibrium in
mixed quantum games. This is not surprising given
that probabilistic mixtures form a convex structure,
which is an essential ingredient for fixed-point theo-
rems to hold on “flat” manifolds such as Rm.
PURE QUANTUM GAMES AND NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
No fixed-point theorem guarantee for Nash equi-
librium in pure quantum strategies is known to exist
in the literature. This is surprising perhaps given the
4rich, albeit non-convex, mathematical structure of
CPn. More precisely, CPn has a compact Rieman-
nian (Kahler in fact) manifold structure with posi-
tive sectional curvature with respect to the Fubini-
Study metric [14]. We use the richness of the mathe-
matical structure of CPn here to produce a guaran-
tee of Nash equilibrium in pure quantum strategies,
under restrictive conditions, by invoking Nash’s em-
bedding theorem:
Nash embedding theorem: For every compact
Riemannian manifold M , there exists an isometric
embedding of M into Rm for a suitably large m.
The Nash embedding theorem tells us that CPn is
diffeomorphic to its image under a length preserving
map into Rm. The homeomorphism underlying this
diffeomorphism allows us to treat CPn and its im-
age inside Rm as topologically equivalent; hence, we
can treat CPn as a sub-manifold S of Rm and look
for a fixed-point guarantee for continuous set-valued
functions F
CPn
e
−֒→ S
F
−→ 2S (9)
via Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, where e is the
Nash embedding. To this end, recall that the Kaku-
tani fixed-point theorem requires S to be compact
and convex. Since e is a homeomorphism and CPn
is compact, S is compact in Rm. However, S is not
necessarily convex as homeomorphisms do not pre-
serve convexity in general. Note also that the lin-
earity of Nash embedding e would be insufficient to
ensure convexity of S, for an element q of CPn is
equivalent to all scalar multiples λq, for λ 6= 0. This
violates the definition of convexity, which requires
the possibility that λ = 0.
But suppose for the moment that there exists a
convex embedding S of CPn into Rm. For the Kaku-
tani fixed-point theorem to be applicable to F , one
encases S in a simplex ∆, establishes Kakutani’s
theorem on ∆ via barycentric subdivision and the
Brouwer fixed-point theorem [15] , and then con-
structs a retract function
R : ∆ −→ S (10)
that fixes the points of S, that is,
R(s) = s (11)
for all s ∈ S. One can visualize the action of R
as projecting ∆ onto S, possibly in a geometrically
⊗
N
i=1CP
di 2(⊗
N
i=1
CPdi )
⊗
N
i=1CP
di
S
B
m 2B
m
e
QC b′
h◦C
e−1
F
F′
r b
FIG. 1. Establishing the guarantee of Nash equilibrium
in pure quantum strategies in a quantum game Q using
Nash’s embedding theorem. The functions b and b′ take
a fixed-point from the power set back to the set.
convoluted way, and projecting the points of S onto
themselves. Next, one defines a set-valued function
F ′ : ∆ −→ 2∆ (12)
as F ′(s) = F (R(s)); this function is upper-
semicontinuous, and its fixed points lie in S and are
therefore fixed points of F .
Therefore, whenever it is possible to construct e
so that S is convex in some Rm, then as per the
discussion in the preceding paragraph, Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategy quantum games is guaranteed.
On the other hand, when S is not convex, for exam-
ple when S = e
(
CP 1
)
= S2 ⊂ R3, then one can
extend to its convex hull Conv(S) (taking into ac-
count the conditions outlined in the Caveats section
below) via the convex hull operation, call it C, and
note that by Caratheodory’s theorem [16] Conv(S)
is compact. It is a well-established topological fact
that a non-empty, convex compact subset of Rm is
homeomorphic to the closed unit ball
B
m =

(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ R
m :
m∑
j=1
x2j ≤ 1

 . (13)
Let h be the homeomorphism Conv(S) ∼= Bm. The
set-valued function F in (9) now has factors
S
C
−→ conv(S)
h
−→ Bm
F
−→ 2B
m
(14)
with continuous F .
Next, set the payoff function Fi = Qi to be any
linear function with the property that the elements
of its image can be pre-ordered so that(7) and (8)
may be invoked. This produces convex countering
sets F(h(C(e(q)))) of the image e(q) of a play q of
5Q and guarantees a fixed point for F . To ensure
the existence of fixed-points of F over S, construct
a retract
r : Bm −→ S (15)
and define the set-valued function
F ′(v) = F(r(v)) (16)
so that the fixed points of F ′ lie in S and hence are
the fixed points of F . Mapping the fixed points back
to CPn via e−1 gives a Nash equilibrium q∗ in Q.
This construction is captured in FIG. 1 for the
relevant n. Note that when S is convex, Conv(S) =
S and our construction restricts to an application of
the Kakutani fixed-point theorem. Therefore, up to
the caveats mentioned in the following section, our
construction guarantees Nash equilibrium in general.
Identifying the values of m for which CPn embeds
as a convex subset into Rm appears to be an open
problem to the best of our knowledge.
CAVEATS
The Nash equilibrium guarantee due to the con-
struction in FIG. 1 comes with the conditions that S
is non-empty and that S does not equal the bound-
ary of Conv(S). We elaborate below.
Denote by ∂ the boundary of a non-empty set.
Then, h(∂Conv(S)) ∼= ∂h(Conv(S)) = ∂Bm =
S
m−1, where
S
m−1 =

(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n :
m∑
j=1
x2j = 1

 (17)
is the (m− 1)-dimensional sphere. Again, it is well-
established that no retract exists from Bm to Sm−1
[17] (the no-retract theorem). Therefore, if the Nash
embedding S = ∂Conv(S), then the construction
in FIG. 1 will fail to guarantee Nash equilibrium.
This is certainly true for N = 1 and di = 1 in the
definition of a quantum game in (3), giving CP 1 =
S2 = ∂B2 (recall that CP 1 is S2 and hence the latter
is the natural Nash embedding) as the single player’s
strategy set. Fortunately, since we are concerned
only with multiplayer games, N ≥ 2.
In general, the elements of any set are the extreme
points of its convex hull, that is, points x and y in the
convex hull for which λx+(1−λ)y implies that either
λ = 0 or λ = 1. Moreover, the set of extreme points
generally forms a proper subset of the boundary of
a convex set. Hence,
S ⊂ ∂Conv(S) =⇒ h(S) ⊂ Sm−1. (18)
Next, to see that it is possible to have a retract from
Bm to h(S) ⊂ Sm−1, note that every continuous
function from Bm to Sm−1 moves at least one point
of the (m−1)-sphere by the no-retract theorem. The
extreme case where all the points move is undesir-
able, but any other situation gives a subset S of fixed
points of Sm−1 over which a retract from Bm may
be constructed. Setting h(S) = S will give a class
of retracts to serve as the function r in FIG. 1. For
example, the function
f : (x1, . . . , xm)→

x1, . . . , xm−1,
√√√√1−
m−1∑
j=1
x2j


(19)
has the ”upper hemisphere” as retract.
AN APPLICATION OF PURE STRATEGY
QUANTUM GAMES
As an application of Nash equilibrium in pure
quantum strategies, consider the problem of prepar-
ing a n qudit state. Due to decoherence errors, quan-
tum states can deviate from some desired configu-
ration. To model the state preparation and deco-
herence errors as a non-cooperative pure strategy
quantum game, we introduce N notional players so
that each player prefers the prepared state to be
closest to his desired configuration. A state prepar-
ing quantum mechanism Q can now be viewed as a
non-cooperative, pure strategy quantum game that
maps a play of the game to a quantum superposition
q =
∑n
j=1 αjbj ∈ ⊗
n
i=1CP
di with
∑
|αj |
2 = 1, and
in which the payoffs are defined by the overlap of
the prepared quantum state relative to the desired
configuration of each player, or in other words, the
inner-product of the two states. This linear payoff
function is
Qi(q) = 〈ψi, q〉 (20)
with ψi ∈ ⊗
N
i=1CP
di the preferred state of the i-
th player. The fact that the complex numbers can
be pre-ordered, combined with the linearity of Qi(q),
6allows one to invoke (7) and (8) to establish the con-
vexity of F(h(C(e(q)))) = Ce(q).
By an application of the Nash embedding theorem
and the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, we conclude
that this game has fixed-point guarantee of Nash
equilibrium and that there is an optimal solution
to the problem of preparing a pure quantum state
under the constraint of decoherence. A similar game
model can also be applied to parameter estimation
problems, especially in the context of quantum logic
gates.[18, 19].
In contrast, we may also consider the case of a
quantum game in which the payoff is defined with
respect to a physical observable, as is typically done
in quantum game theory literature. A physical ob-
servable is represented by a linear Hermitian opera-
tor whose eigenstates define possible outcomes. We
may define the expectation value of such an opera-
tor with respect to a prepared quantum state q as
the corresponding payoff. The payoff function Q¯i
calculates the expected value of q to player i via
Q¯i(q) =
n∑
j=1
ej |αj |
2 (21)
where the ej are real numbers that numerically re-
flect the preferences of player i over observable states
bj of ⊗
n
i=1CP
di and |αj |
2 is the probability with
which q measures as bj. The payoff function Q¯i is
not linear in general. Hence, the convexity of Ce(q)
does not follow in general and neither does a fixed-
point guarantee for the existence of Nash equilib-
rium. This result is consistent with the results based
on the quantization schemes a la Eisert et al. which
define payoffs via (21) and for which pure quantum
strategy Nash equilibrium are known to not exist in
general.
For details on how quantum games are realized ex-
perimentally, we refer the reader to [20]. For a com-
plete game-theoretic model for designing two qubit
quantum computational mechanisms at Nash equi-
librium, we refer the reader to [21, 22].
FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF QUANTUM
GAMES
State amplification quantum algorithms like the
famous Grover’s algorithm [23] may be viewed as
non-cooperative games between a player and Nature.
Consider the quantum state representing the item
being searched for as the preferred configuration of
the player with control over x qubits, while Nature,
with her y qubits, prefers anything but this configu-
ration, with x+ y = n. A multiplayer model is also
possible. If the players’ payoffs are given linearly as
in (20), then the algorithm has a Nash equilibrium
solution. If the payoffs are computed via (21), then
Nash equilibrium may not exist.
With respect to mixed strategies, a natural appli-
cation of quantum games would be in the areas of
quantum communication or stochastic quantum pro-
cesses where a coalition of players (Alice and Bob)
engage in a non-cooperative way with the eavesdrop-
per (Eve) [24]. Alice and Bob want to amplify pri-
vacy of the communication whereas Eve does not,
and in fact may want to decrease it. If the Alice and
Bob coalition and Eve try to achieve their respec-
tive outcomes via random quantum processes, then
Glicksberg’s theorem will guarantee a Nash equilib-
rium. With this guarantee in place, mechanism de-
sign methods can be adopted to find an equilibrium.
An important class of quantum games would be
those that study equilibrium behavior of the sub-
set of generalized quantum measurements on finite
dimensional systems known as local operations and
classical communication (LOCC), a set that is both
compact and convex [25]. Because LOCC is sig-
nificant in many quantum information processes as
the natural class of operations, and given its com-
pact and convex structures, constructing a non-
cooperative finite quantum game model for it would
be a worthwhile effort.
Adiabatic quantum computing [26–28] can poten-
tially benefit from the quantum game model. An
adiabatic quantum computation starts with a sys-
tem of n qudits in its lowest energy state. A Hamil-
tonian HI is constructed that corresponds to this
lowest energy state and another Hamiltonian Hf is
used to encode an objective function the solution of
which is the minimum energy state of Hf . Finally,
the actual adiabatic computation occurs as the in-
terpolating Hamiltonian
H (s(t)) = s(t)HI + (1− s(t))Hf (22)
which is expected to adiabatically transform the low-
est energy state of HI to that of Hf as a function
of the interpolating path s(t) with respect to time t.
For large enough t values, adiabaticity holds; on the
other hand, t should be much smaller than its corre-
7sponding value in classical computational processes
for H(s(t)) to constitute a worthwhile effort.
Note that under exponentiation, H(s(t)) cor-
responds to a time-dependent unitary map from
⊗ni=1CP
di to itself that we can view as a zero-
sum, non-cooperative quantum game. This quan-
tum game has a notional player I that prefers an
element of ⊗ni=1CP
di that corresponds to the low-
est energy state of Hf . Player II or Nature, prefers
anything but this element. Players I and II can be
given access to any division of qubits to manipulate
respectively via pure quantum strategies. Again, if
the payoffs to the players are linear, then a Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed.
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